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ABSTRACT 
By investigating the determinants of CDS spreads on European contracts before and after the 
recent crisis we observe significant differences in the explanatory power of market and firm-
specific variables. Before the crisis, the underlying credit risk in the overall CDS market is 
sufficient to explain credit risk. During the crisis investors have a differing view on the risk of 
financial and non-financial contracts; whereas non-financial CDS contracts reflect the credit risk 
of the counterparty, financial contracts do not. Our results suggest that in case of default of 
financial firms, investors expect the government to intervene to alleviate credit risk of the 
counterparty and fears of systemic risk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bond markets have been traditionally regarded as appropriate indicators to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of a borrower. The risk underlying these bonds is observed in the spread 
between the risky and risk free bond yields. Empirical models motivated from structural form 
equations describing fixed income prices have been used to explain variation on bond spreads. 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Avramov et al. (2007) are within this group of articles. These 
authors use in particular, the risk free rate, volatility and leverage.  
The illiquidity of bond markets and the choice of appropriate measures to proxy the risk free 
bond rate make the bond spread not very suitable to analyze credit risk at high (monthly, daily) 
frequencies. Recently, the interest has shifted to studying credit risk indirectly by looking at 
derivative markets, in particular Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts. A CDS is an insurance 
agreement between a protection buyer and a seller written on the default risk of a reference entity 
or obligation. Under the agreement, the buyer makes periodic payments to the seller until the 
occurrence of the credit event or maturity, and if a credit event occurs the seller compensates the 
buyer with the amount that is equal to the difference between the par value and recovery of the 
reference obligation. 
The study of CDS spreads for gauging credit risk can be theoretically and empirically 
motivated. As documented by Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu (2004), CDS and bond spreads 
converge to each other in the long run but there are significant differences between each other in 
the short run. These differences are due to the higher liquidity of the CDS market that is able to 
reflect changes in market conditions faster than bond spreads. Also, in contrast to bond prices 
CDS contracts are standardized products designed to reflect credit risk of the reference entity. 
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Bond prices, on the other hand, differ depending on the characteristics of the bond, the structure 
of coupon payments or the maturity of the debt.  
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) is one of the first studies that concentrates on CDS spreads to 
explain credit risk. These authors, following the structural model approach as in Collin-Dufresne 
et al. (2001), use market variables as well as credit ratings and explain 82% of variation in CDS 
spreads. The choice of explanatory variables for the analysis of credit risk from CDS spreads is 
also an important issue highly debated in the empirical literature. Thus, Benkert (2004) describes 
CDS spreads by mainly concentrating on volatility measures. This author observes that the effect 
of option-implied volatility is higher on CDS spreads compared to the effect of historical 
volatility, that is, forward-looking measures of risk have a higher impact on CDS prices than 
historical measures. Further to Benkert (2004), Cao et al. (2006) conclude that the relation 
between option-implied volatility and CDS market is especially stronger when CDS spreads are 
more volatile, the rating of the reference entity is low and options are more liquid. Zhang et al. 
(2009) mainly investigate the relationship between equity return and CDS market and 
specifically explore the effect of stochastic volatility and jumps on CDS spreads. By calculating 
historical volatility from equity return data and the contribution of the jump using high frequency 
data, their results imply that volatility risk can alone explain 50% of CDS spread variation, while 
jump risk can predict 19% of the variation.  
Greatrex (2009) sheds important doubts on the conclusions derived from the analysis of CDS 
spreads in levels obtained in other articles, the reason being the existence of spurious regression 
analyses that invalidate any statistical inference; Greatrex (2009) proposes instead the analysis of 
changes on CDS spreads. By generating a rating based index based on CDS spreads and a 
structural form model incorporating market variables, this author explains 35% of variation in 
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CDS spread changes. Ericsson et al. (2009) also analyze CDS spreads in levels and changes 
using structural form variables. These authors explain 23% of variation in CDS spread changes 
and up to 70% of variation in CDS spread levels.   
Although there are many studies on the credit risk of the reference entity, there are not many 
on the credit risk of the protection seller. The analysis of this risk (counterparty risk) gains 
importance when the seller cannot fulfill its obligations under the occurrence of default of the 
reference entity. Some of the theoretical studies incorporating the effect of counterparty risk 
when pricing CDS contracts are Jarrow and Yu (2001), Hull and White (2001) and Yu (2007). 
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical work on analyzing this effect is Arora et al. 
(2010). Further, since the financial crisis of 2007-2009 counterparty risk has become more 
apparent due to the collapse of the main counterparties such as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers 
and the bailouts of many other financial institutions. CDS contracts have been observed to 
amplify and spread uncertainty in the financial sector by reducing investors’ confidence and also 
leading to financial contagion due to interconnectedness of the main counterparties. This is the 
reason why understanding the dynamics of credit spreads on these markets is now more 
important than ever as this financial derivative has played a critical role in the unfolding of the 
financial crisis.  
The aim of this study is to find the drivers of credit risk by analyzing credit default swap 
spreads from April 2005 to November 2010. To do this we consider counterparty risk and a CDS 
market index (iTraxx Europe), that plays the role of the market portfolio in the standard asset 
pricing models, in addition to the variables considered so far in the literature. We also explore 
the analysis of CDS spreads not only in levels but also in changes using appropriate econometric 
techniques for each series. The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows.  
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First, we aim to compare the explanatory power of firm-specific versus market variables on 
credit risk. In the literature, only Blanco et al. (2005) analyze both bond and CDS spreads from 
this perspective. Their results indicate that CDS spreads are more sensitive to firm-specific 
variables, whereas bond spreads are affected by market variables. Different from this study, our 
sample involves data from both early stages of the CDS market and the recent financial crisis 
period. This enables us to investigate the effect of potential breaks in the dataset and see how the 
recent financial turmoil has changed the way that credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The 
empirical analysis indicates that before the crisis market variables are sufficient to explain credit 
risk. In contrast to most of related literature, our study also contemplates the iTraxx index for 
pricing CDS spreads. Our study reveals that this index, that reflects general market conditions in 
the European CDS market, is the most important variable for explaining single CDS contracts. 
However, the outlook completely changes after the crisis. We observe that financial and non-
financial firms behave in a very different way. In particular, for the non-financial contracts in our 
study is it the variables describing the features of the underlying entity (firm-specific variables) 
as well as counterparty risk what really explain credit risk. For the financial contracts, on the 
other hand, both market and firm-specific variables lose their predictive power to describe credit 
risk.  
Second, we explicitly analyze the effect of counterparty risk when pricing CDS contracts. As 
mentioned before, CDS spreads also carry counterparty risk as it is likely that CDS sellers can 
also default and not fulfill their obligations. Arora et al. (2010) use contemporaneous CDS 
transaction prices and quotes from fourteen dealers selling CDS on the same reference entity. 
They consider CDS spread of counterparty as a proxy for the counterparty risk. They find that 
counterparty risk is priced in the CDS spreads written on non-financial firms, but not on the 
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financial ones. These authors also observe that the effect of counterparty risk on CDS spreads 
increases after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In contrast to these authors we use a different 
proxy for gauging the influence of the counterparty. Our aim is to answer the following two 
research questions: Is counterparty risk reflected in CDS prices or the spread is a pure indicator 
of default risk of the reference entity? Is the effect of counterparty risk on CDS contracts higher 
after the break produced by the financial crisis? Our findings indicate that before the structural 
break occurred in each CDS contract counterparty risk is ignored. However, after the crisis, 
counterparty risk has started to be priced in all contracts except those on financial companies.    
Third, we correct an important technical oversight in this literature that considers standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) dynamic regressions to describe CDS spreads in levels, see for 
example Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Benkert (2004), or Ericsson et al. (2009). These authors 
report the coefficient of determination (R
2
) to gauge goodness of fit measures for dynamic 
regression models in levels. All these authors claim to explain over 90% of variation in CDS 
spread level. However, the CDS spreads in levels are usually modeled as a unit root process, and 
as such, these processes have a variance that increases to infinity invalidating, in general, 
statistical analyses and conclusions based on the R
2
. To avoid spurious regressions, we analyze 
CDS spread in levels under a co-integration framework, and also make allowance for the 
presence of a break to account for possible regime or level shifts in the long run relationship. We 
conclude that the iTraxx Europe and VIX index for the market variables, and the implied 
volatility and stock price for the firm-specific variables are co-integrated with CDS spreads. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the dataset, 
present our explanatory variables and their expected relationship with CDS spreads. In Section 
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III, we explain the econometric methodology followed in this study and report our findings on 
CDS spread analysis. Section IV concludes. An appendix collects tables and figures. 
II. THE DETERMINANTS of CDS SPREADS 
This section introduces the dataset used for our empirical analysis; it describes the 
determinants of CDS spreads and discusses the expected relationship between these variables. 
A. CDS Data 
In this study, monthly mid quotes of CDS spreads are obtained from Bloomberg which is one 
of the leading financial data providers. In particular we consider the contracts with the following 
specifications: senior debt, EURO currency, quarterly premium payment, and five year maturity. 
The contracts with five year maturity are chosen specifically as it is by far the most commonly 
traded tenor which leads to the most liquid contracts. The dataset in this study covers the period 
April 2005 to November 2010. We have selected this period for two reasons: First, CDS market 
is more mature compared to the beginning of the twenty first century, and second, after 
experiencing tremendous growth the market started to shrink in 2008 due to the financial crisis 
all over the world. Therefore, this sample period is ideal to investigate the existence and effect of 
structural breaks in individual contracts and estimate potential different models for both volatile 
and tranquil periods. As one of the main aims of this study is to investigate the effect of 
counterparty risk on CDS spreads, we use data of CDS contracts sold by HSBC Bank PLC which 
is one of the major counterparties in the CDS Market. The data sample is obtained from 
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Bloomberg HSBC page which displays CDS quotations on contracts that are priced and sold by 
HSBC Bank
1
.  
As we believe that analyzing individual contracts from different sectors will give us more 
reliable results than pooling the data or taking the average of coefficients as done in the 
literature, we select for our analysis ten firms representative of the main sectors of economic 
activity in Europe. The choice of these companies is due to their relative importance in 
explaining the performance of the sector and data availability. The name of the firms and their 
corresponding industry information are listed in Table 1. We have two groups in our dataset: 
Aviva and Deutsche Bank are grouped as financial firms and the other eight firms are grouped as 
non-financial ones. 
Table 1 
List of Reference Entities in the Dataset 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Ideally, this analysis should include data provided by other CDS dealers, and not only HSBC. Unfortunately, only data on CDS 
spreads traded by HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) are made public in Bloomberg. Since data on RBS CDS spreads 
have a significant amount of missing observations, we choose to work only with CDS spreads on HSBC Bank. 
 
Reference Entity Sector Group
Aviva PLC Financials-Insurance Financial
Bayer AG Pharmaceuticals Non-Financial
BMW AG Automotive Non-Financial
Deutsche Bank Financials-Bank Financial
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC Tobacco Non-Financial
Philips Electronics N.V. Technology Non-Financial
Tesco PLC Retail Non-Financial
Total S.A. Energy Non-Financial
Vinci PLC Construction Non-Financial
Vodafone Group PLC Telecommunications Non-Financial
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Figure 1 
 CDS Spreads of Reference Entities Over Time 
 
 
Figure 1 presents CDS spread levels of the contracts from April 2005 to November 2010 
chosen for this study. All CDS spreads began to rise sharply due to the signals of the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the second half of 2007. At the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 they made 
peaks when many collapses and bailouts in financial markets took place. At the end of 2010, 
CDS spreads are much lower than at their peak values but still vulnerable to financial shocks. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spreads of Reference Entities 
 
As observed in Table 2, cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads over the period is also 
remarkably high. Although the minimum spread is only 7 basis points (bps) for Aviva and Total, 
the maximum spread level recorded is 435 bps (BMW). The average spread ranges from a low of 
35 bps for Total to a high of 115 bps for Imperial.  An indicator of volatility, standard deviation, 
is varying between 26 bps (Bayer) and 97 bps (Imperial). The descriptive statistics of CDS 
spreads also reveal that Imperial and BMW are relatively riskier than other reference entities 
since they have the highest mean and standard deviation. The reasons behind this conclusion are 
that a higher spread is viewed as higher credit risk of the underlying entity, and high standard 
deviation is an indicator of high volatility and hence of high default risk.  
B. Explanatory Variables and Their Relationship with CDS Spread 
Credit Default Swaps are usually priced using two different approaches. For reduced form 
models default is the outcome of a random jump process and is regarded as an unpredictable 
event. For structural form models, the asset value of a company is assumed to be consisting of 
equity and a zero coupon bond; default occurs if the value of the firm’s asset is less than the 
promised debt payment at the maturity of the debt.  Risk free rate, leverage and volatility of the 
AVIVA BAYER BMW
DEUTSCHE 
BANK
IMPERIAL PHILIPS TESCO TOTAL VICCI VODAFONE
CDS Spread Level
Mean 86 48 88 61 115 51 52 35 89 67
Standard Deviation 85 26 95 46 97 31 40 31 60 44
Range 7 to 420 15 to 145 9 to 435 9 to 155 30 to 415 14 to 160 8 to 145 7 to 145 29 to 290 23 to 200
CDS Spread Change
Mean 1.57 0.37 1.05 1.42 0.72 0.41 0.86 0.72 1.05 0.83
Standard Deviation 39 12 47 22 38 14 11 13 25 19
Range -115 to 175 -35 to 43 -160 to 180 -55 to 70 -140 to 205 -55 to 40 -35 to 42 -50 to 55 -105 to 115 -60 to 73
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asset are the main empirically tested determinants of structural form models. However, as 
documented in many papers, their explanatory power is empirically weak. We believe that the 
structural model needs adding more explanatory variables that reflect the features of CDS 
contracts and of general market conditions. In particular, we are interested in two sets of 
variables classified as market and firm-specific variables. In the next section, we will explain the 
variables and their theoretical relationship to CDS spreads.  
Firm-specific Variables 
The set of variables that we use in this group are volatility, stock price, liquidity of the 
contract and credit risk of the counterparty. In a similar study that investigates the effect of bond 
liquidity on CDS-bond basis, Nashikkar et al. (2010) use instead leverage, tangible assets and 
current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities) as firm-specific variables. The 
variables for our study are motivated as follows. 
It is an empirical fact that an increase in volatility leads to an increase in CDS spread. The 
intuition for this is that since default depends on the movement of the firm value, the latter is 
more likely to default if its value oscillates more. As discussed before, there are mainly two types 
of volatility measures in the literature: historical and option-implied volatility. Whereas option-
implied volatility reflects market expectation of future volatility, historical volatility shows how 
volatile the asset was in the past.  Benkert (2004) and Cao et al. (2006) analyze and compare the 
effect of these two volatility measures on CDS spread and conclude that although both have a 
positive relationship with CDS spreads, the effect of option-implied volatility is stronger than 
historical volatility. Based on previous studies and the forward-looking characteristics of option-
implied volatility, we only give place to this volatility measure in our study. 
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Stock price of the firm reflects the business and financial condition of the underlying 
company. Thus, any negative news about the company is observed in stock prices faster than in 
any other variable such as rating. Further, as documented in Welch (2004), stock price is the best 
proxy for capturing variation in leverage. Ideally, leverage should be computed as the ratio of the 
book value of debt divided by the market value of equity. However, book values of debt are 
reported on a quarterly basis making difficult to obtain monthly measures of leverage. Instead, a 
valid proxy for leverage used in the literature is the stock return.  A higher stock return leads to 
smaller leverage and an improvement on the financial condition, and hence smaller credit risk.  
Another firm-specific variable is liquidity. Literature regarding the impact of this variable on 
CDS spreads is contradictory. On the one hand, since it is a derivative contract, not an asset, it is 
argued that CDS spreads cannot contain a liquidity premium. On the other hand, the occurrence 
of a large bid-ask spread is interpreted as existence of illiquidity risk. In this study, to minimize 
the presence of illiquidity effects, we only analyze five year contracts as they represent the most 
liquid segment of the market. Nevertheless, in order to accommodate any illiquidity effect in this 
market we consider the spread between bid-ask CDS levels as a proxy for illiquidity, see also 
Tang and Yan (2006). Our expectation is that an increase in illiquidity will trigger an upward 
movement in CDS spreads.   
Another very relevant factor in our analysis is counterparty risk. As experienced during the 
financial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the bailout of Bear Sterns, the sellers of 
CDS contracts are not default-free. Furthermore, it is a stylized fact that different CDS contracts 
written on the same reference entity have a different price, finding that we attribute to the risk of 
the sellers. Thus, if the seller of the contract has a higher credit rating compared to the other 
sellers, the corresponding CDS contract will be more expensive. Arora et al. (2010) use the 
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spread of CDS written on the default risk of the protection seller as a proxy for counterparty risk. 
We believe, however, that the CDS spread of the counterparty cannot be an indicator of pure 
counterparty risk as it also reflects general market conditions. Considering this fact, we subtract 
the change in the iTraxx index from the change in CDS spread of the counterparty (HSBC Bank 
for our data) and use this “premium” variable as a proxy for counterparty risk. The idea is similar 
to standard capital asset pricing formulations based on excess returns. We expect a negative 
relationship between the proxy for counterparty risk and CDS spreads, that is, when credit risk of 
the counterparty deteriorates, investors are not willing to pay a higher premium for the contracts 
offered by the counterparty.  
Market Variables 
In the second group, consisting of market variables, we consider the risk free rate, S&P 500, 
iTraxx Europe and VIX indices. 
The structural approach predicts a negative relationship between the interest rate and credit 
spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) note that a higher interest rate should increase the risk-
neutral drift of the value process which reduces the probability of default and decreases spreads. 
In this study, we use one year Euro swap rate as a proxy for interest rate. We prefer to use swap 
rates instead of government bond rates, as government bonds are not regarded as benchmark for 
the risk free rate any more by financial markets due to illiquidity, short sale and tax 
considerations.  
The stock market sentiment is also very relevant to our analysis. We include this variable as a 
market variable because we believe that the stock market return is one of the most relevant 
proxies for the overall business climate. As general market condition affects expected recovery 
rates, CDS spread will narrow when economic activity is high and widen when economic 
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activity is low. Avramov et al. (2007), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Greatrex (2009) and 
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) confirm a negative relationship between S&P 500 index and credit 
risk. In this study, we also give place to S&P 500 index as a proxy for general market conditions 
as it is known as the leading stock market index in financial markets. A related measure of asset 
markets’ sentiment more relevant for our analysis of credit risk is the CDS Market Index. We 
believe that an index constructed from CDS contracts can reflect the market condition especially 
in the CDS market better than an equity market index. Consequently, we use the iTraxx Europe 
index as a proxy for CDS Market Index; this index is made up of 125 equally-weighted European 
names selected by a dealer poll based on CDS volume traded over the previous six months. We 
expect a strong positive relationship between iTraxx Europe index and CDS spread.  
Besides firm-specific volatility, we also consider the Volatility index (VIX) which is a 
measure of implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options that accounts for overall market 
volatility. Greatrex (2009) documents a positive relationship between VIX index and CDS 
spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) conclude that an increase in VIX index raises credit 
spread, yet a decrease does not have an effect on credit spreads. As our dataset contains 
information from a very volatile period, we expect a positive relationship between CDS spreads 
and VIX index. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this study we prefer to use monthly frequency data since some CDS spreads do not change 
on a daily basis and can have extreme values on some days. From a technical point of view daily 
data are exposed to autocorrelation problems which can lead to unreliable empirical results using 
standard econometric methods.  
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We begin with an overview of CDS spreads in the period we examine. Figure 2 exhibits time 
series plots of monthly CDS spreads of two contracts versus explanatory variables. We select 
two contracts as representatives of the data sample. One contract from the non-financial group is 
BMW, and the other one from the financial group is Deutsche Bank. Figure 2 in the Appendix 
(Panels A, B and C) plots monthly CDS spreads in levels against iTraxx, VIX and S&P 500 
indices, respectively. Until the beginning of 2008, the tranquil period, the plots make apparent 
the positive relationship between CDS spreads and iTraxx and VIX indices and the negative 
relationship between CDS spreads and S&P 500 index. However, after 2008 due to the effects of 
the financial crisis, we observe that CDS spreads generally move independently from aggregate 
market sentiment. Figure 2, Panel D, plots the relationship between CDS spreads and the risk 
free rate. Until April 2007, in line with theory, CDS spreads move inversely to the risk free rate. 
Figure 2, Panel E and F exhibit the plot of CDS spread levels versus implied volatility and stock 
price, respectively. As expected, we generally observe a positive relationship between implied 
volatility and CDS spread and a negative relationship between stock price and CDS spreads.  
 Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Blanco et al. (2005), Benkert (2004) and other related papers use 
panel data analysis to study the relation between the variables. These panel data models assume 
that all the contracts in the data sample have the same relationship with the explanatory 
variables. For example, these models expect that every CDS contract has the same relationship 
with the variable gauging counterparty risk. For this reason, we believe that the results from 
panel data analysis can be misleading. Similarly, papers such as Greatrex (2009), Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009) run the regressions for each contract separately, 
and report the average of coefficients which can also lead to invalid inferences if the actual 
relation between variables varies with the CDS contract. Instead, we select a sample of ten CDS 
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contracts, each representing a different economic sector, and present the results separately for 
each firm in our dataset.  
In order to analyze CDS spreads in levels and changes, we need different econometric 
methods. Initially, we analyze CDS spreads using a co-integration analysis. Second, we analyze 
changes in CDS spreads in a stationary dynamic regression framework for two separate periods, 
namely tranquil and volatile periods. 
A. Co-integration Analysis 
The empirical literature concerned with CDS spreads is surprisingly successful in explaining 
the determinants of this variable. For example, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Ericsson et al. (2009) 
and Benkert (2004) find R
2
 values close to 90% that indicate an extraordinary fit of the 
regressors used by the authors. Unfortunately, CDS spreads usually follow unit root processes 
implying non-stationary dynamic regression models and yielding, in turn, residual series that are 
also non-stationary unless the regressors are co-integrated to the CDS spread. The unit root 
character of the residuals implies that its variance grows over time, yielding an R
2 
that 
approaches one as the sample size increases, and invalidating any conclusion based on this 
goodness of fit measure. To avoid spurious regression inferences, see Granger and Newbold 
(1974), we will analyze CDS spreads in a co-integration framework. 
For instance, for the relation between CDS spread and iTraxx, the long run regression 
equation is given by  
(1)     𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡    
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where 𝜀𝑡  is the stationary error variable under the null hypothesis of co-integration. This 
equation captures the long run relationship between these variables, but it does not take into 
account any possible change in the long run relationship due to potential structural breaks in the 
data. This implies that the results of the analysis can be misleading under the presence of a break 
in the data due to the financial crisis. Hence, we will use Gregory and Hansen Co-integration test 
(1996) which accounts for a change in the long run relationship by considering the presence of a 
potential structural break. Gregory and Hansen propose an Augmented Dickey-Fuller type test 
designed to test the null of no co-integration against the alternative of co-integration in the 
presence of a shift in the relationship. In particular, we consider the cases where the intercept 
and/or slope coefficients have a single break at an unknown time.  
In order to incorporate the occurrence of a break at an unknown time, we include a dummy 
variable defined as  
𝜑𝑡𝜏=  
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≤  𝑛𝜏 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > [𝑛𝜏]
  
where the unknown parameter  𝜏 ∈  (0, 1) denotes the (relative) timing of the change point, 
and [.] denotes the integer part. Thus, the model with a shift in the intercept is 
 
(2)       𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝜑𝑡𝜏 + 𝛼𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
with 𝜇1 the intercept before the shift and 𝜇2 the change in the intercept at the time of the 
shift. The model with shift in the intercept and slope is 
 
(3)    𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝜑𝑡𝜏 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼2𝜑𝑡𝜏 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
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with 𝛼1denoting the co-integrating slope coefficients before the regime shift and 𝛼2 the 
change in the slope coefficients due to the shift.  
In order to choose whether to use a co-integration test or not, we apply Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) unit root test that makes allowance for a structural break at an unknown time. This test 
indicates that liquidity of each contract, counterparty risk and risk free rate are stationary 
variables.
2
 Hence, for simplicity in the analysis, we only consider iTraxx Europe and VIX index 
from market variables and stock price and implied volatility from firm-specific variables in the 
co-integration analyses.   
In Table 3, we present our findings for Models (2) and (3). The results indicate that CDS 
spreads of all reference entities are co-integrated with iTraxx Europe, VIX index, implied 
volatility and stock price. From the statistical analysis of the model coefficients, Model (3) seems 
to be suited for Aviva, Philips, Imperial Tobacco, Total and Vinci; this model depicts a regime 
shift in the long run relationship which indicates that the relationship between CDS spreads and 
explanatory variables changes due to a structural break. For the rest of firms we only observe a 
level shift in the intercept but not in the slope coefficients. The relationship with the explanatory 
variables is in line with the expectations outlined in the previous section. All CDS levels depict a 
positive and strong relationship with iTraxx Europe index implying that changes in iTraxx 
Europe index are quickly incorporated into CDS spreads. Regarding the effect of volatility 
measures, we observe that for the VIX index our data do not provide strong statistical evidence 
that supports the existence of a positive relationship with CDS spreads. On the contrary, we 
observe that the firm-specific implied volatility exhibits a positive relation with some CDS 
spreads such as Bayer, Imperial Tobacco, Tesco, Total, Vinci and Vodafone. Regarding the 
                                                          
2
 Results on Zivot and Andrews Test are available from the authors upon request. 
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relation between stock price and CDS spreads, our dataset reveals that only BMW, Philips 
Electronics and Tesco’s stock price have a statistical negative influence on the CDS spreads. 
B. Dynamic Stationary Regressions 
For the CDS spread change analysis we follow a different strategy. First, we detect the break 
dates to differentiate the tranquil and volatile periods. Then, we analyze CDS spreads in changes 
considering all explanatory variables in two periods. As observed in Figure 1, all individual CDS 
contracts depict a tranquil and a volatile period highlighting the existence of structural breaks in 
the dataset. Annaert et al. (2010) consider April 2007 and Cesare and Guazzarotti (2010) assume 
July 2007 as structural break dates for all the contracts in their dataset. These authors take these 
break dates as given for every contract in their sample. The choice of the same break date for 
every contract in their study can be misleading, as the idiosyncratic properties of each contract 
are different. 
For the stationary regressions in our analysis, we apply different techniques to detect the 
existence of structural breaks in the sample.  In particular, we use the supremum of a family of 
likelihood ratio tests as suggested by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). To confirm our results we 
also apply a generalized fluctuation test, called OLS-CUSUM test, which tests for a structural 
change using cumulative sums of the common OLS residuals; see Ploberger and Kramer (1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 4 
Structural Break Dates 
 
 
Table 4 shows that for most of the firms in the study the break occurs at the end of 2007 
when the subprime mortgage crisis deepened, liquidity diminished and some hedge funds 
collapsed. For BMW, Imperial Tobacco, Tesco and Total, the break occurred nearly 7-8 months 
later, in the next wave of bankruptcies when the main dealers collapsed and fears of systematic 
defaults triggered in financial markets.  
Under CDS spread change analysis, we first explore the individual relationship between CDS 
spread and iTraxx, S&P 500 and the counterparty risk proxy. With this analysis we are aiming to 
answer two research questions. Is iTraxx index better than S&P 500 to explain individual CDS 
spreads? Is counterparty risk reflected in CDS spreads? In the second stage, we apply 
multivariate regression methods both for firm-specific and market variables to observe which 
group of variables is more successful at explaining CDS spread changes before and after the 
break. With these analyses, we are aiming to find whether the pricing of credit risk has changed 
due to shocks in financial markets. The models here considered are presented below.  
 
Reference Entity Group Structural Break Dates
Aviva PLC Financial December 2007
Bayer AG Non-Financial December 2007
BMW AG Non-Financial July 2008
Deutsche Bank Financial December 2007
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC Non-Financial May 2008
Philips Electronics N.V. Non-Financial December 2007
Tesco PLC Non-Financial August 2008
Total S.A. Non-Financial August 2008
Vinci PLC Non-Financial December 2007
Vodafone Group PLC Non-Financial December 2007
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Univariate Models for iTraxx, VIX and S&P 500 Indices 
(4)     ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆iTraxx𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(5)      ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆VIX𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(6)      ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃 + 𝜀𝑡  
with ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 and 𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃 the log return on S&P500. 
We use univariate regression models to compare the explanatory power of iTraxx Europe and 
S&P 500 indices. The results of this analysis (see Table 5) support our hypothesis. Individual 
CDS contracts are more sensitive to aggregate movements in their own market than in the stock 
market. Moreover, all CDS contracts have a positive and very strong relation with iTraxx Europe 
index before the break. Nevertheless, the influence of iTraxx Europe index on individual CDS 
contracts is remarkably smaller after the break compared to the tranquil period. This finding 
points out that individual contracts break away from aggregate market movements during the 
turmoil period. As a by-product of this analysis we observe that iTraxx Europe and S&P 500 are 
correlated. In order to avoid potential multi-collinearity problems, we just consider iTraxx 
Europe index as a market sentiment variable in the following multivariate regression analyses. 
Multivariate Regression Models for Firm-specific and Market Variables 
(7) ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼5∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
(8)  ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼4∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     
with ImpVol standing for implied volatility; StockRet representing the log return of the stock 
price on the reference entity, Liq is the liquidity of each contract that is measured by bid-ask 
22 
 
spread, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡
𝐻𝑆𝐵𝐶 − ∆𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡  and  ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the change in one year 
Euro Swap Rate.  
Multivariate analyses on CDS spread changes presented in Table 6 propose two intuitive 
conclusions. First, in the pre-crisis period, all CDS spreads are mainly dominated by common 
market factors. However during the crisis, the outlook completely changes and even iTraxx 
Europe index loses its predictive power to explain credit risk. Second, during the crisis, firm-
specific regressions imply different inferences for financial and non-financial firms. For non-
financial ones, CDS spreads become more sensitive to firm-specific variables than to common 
market factors. However, for financial firms such as Aviva operating as an insurance company 
and Deutsche Bank operating as a bank, both market and firm-specific variables fail to explain 
most of the variation in CDS spreads. Therefore, during the crisis, there is a remarkable 
difference in the sensitivity of the financial and non-financial CDS spreads on the firm-specific 
and market variables.   
It is important to notice that the explanatory power of multivariate models in this study is 
very high compared to previous studies based on stationary regression models such as Greatrex 
(2009) and Ericsson et al. (2009). Macro variables explain up to 91 % and 67% of variation in 
CDS spread changes before and after the break, respectively. On the other hand, the variables 
related to firm characteristics can explain the variation in CDS spread change up to 56% and 
77% before and after the break, respectively. These results provide empirical evidence that 
reveals that incorporating iTraxx index and counterparty risk into the regressions enhance the 
explanatory power of empirical models for describing the variation in CDS spreads. 
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C. Analysis of Counterparty Risk 
One of the aims of this study is to investigate whether counterparty risk is incorporated in the 
pricing of CDS spreads or CDS market is still only pricing default risk of reference entity. Figure 
3 plots the evolution of CDS spread changes versus counterparty risk.  
Figure 3 
CDS Spread Change and Counterparty Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, the proxy for counterparty risk is calculated by subtracting the change 
in iTraxx index from the change in counterparty CDS spread. Figure 3 shows that BMW spread 
changes, as a representative of non-financial contracts, do not react to changes in counterparty 
risk until July 2007. However, after this date changes in CDS spread start to move inversely to 
changes in counterparty risk. For Deutsche Bank, as a representative of financial contracts, 
changes in CDS spread are not affected by counterparty risk for all sample period. We use the 
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following univariate regression model to analyze the effect of counterparty risk on CDS spread 
change:  
(9)   ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
The results of this analysis presented in Table 5 suggest different consequences for financial 
and non-financial contracts. We find that non-financial contracts started pricing counterparty risk 
after the break produced by the financial crisis. One possible explanation for this result is that in 
the period preceding the crisis the market assesses CDS dealers as risk-free entities, since no 
major counterparties have experienced bankruptcy, bail-out or default before. Also, 
collateralization could have been considered as a sufficient measure to mitigate counterparty 
risk. However, during the financial crisis, due to the fear of systematic defaults, counterparty risk 
has started to be reflected in CDS prices. Our empirical analysis also suggests that counterparty 
risk is not priced for CDS on financial contracts. This finding is particularly surprising for the 
second period under analysis. The observed increase on default correlation between reference 
entities and the major CDS counterparties in this period should lead to a decrease on the 
corresponding spread that is not observed empirically. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is offered by Arora et al. (2010). These authors suggest that the market expects 
large CDS dealers to be treated as too large to fail when other major financial firms begin to 
default. A similar result is observed by Nashikkar et al. (2010) in the analysis of liquidity effects 
on bond spreads; these authors note that for financial firms there is an implicit obligation by 
regulators to step in when a financial crisis unfolds in order to prevent financial contagion.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This article explores the ability of firm-specific and market variables to explain variation in 
credit default swap spreads in levels and changes. We analyze monthly data of ten firms covering 
the main economic sectors in Europe from April 2005 to November 2010.  
One of the most remarkable results of this study is that the relation between credit spreads 
and their determinants depends very much on the market circumstances prevailing at the time 
period analyzed. In other words, the relation between CDS spread and their determinants is 
regime dependent. Moreover, we find some evidence that CDS spreads of financial firms behave 
quite differently from CDS spreads of non-financial firms, especially during the financial crisis. 
For non-financial firms, CDS spreads are mainly determined by market variables during the 
tranquil period, but by firm-specific variables during the volatile period. However, for non-
financial firms, both firm-specific and market variables are more informative in the tranquil 
period and both lose their explanatory power during the financial crisis.  
The analysis also finds that the iTraxx Europe CDS index is the variable with the strongest 
predictive ability to describe variation in CDS spreads. This finding can be interpreted in a 
similar way to capital asset pricing models for equity markets. However, it is important to notice 
that iTraxx Europe index also loses its predictive power on single CDS contracts during the 
financial crisis period. Hence CDS spreads seem to decouple from the underlying market risk in 
CDS contracts and are mainly driven by idiosyncratic factors.  
Finally, our analysis of counterparty risk offers some of the first insights in the literature on 
the pricing dynamics of counterparty risk in the CDS market. The empirical results indicate that 
counterparty risk has started to be priced in the CDS contracts on non-financial firms after the 
occurrence of the structural break corresponding to the financial crisis period. This is informative 
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for policy makers in that the market does not regard counterparties as risky entities during the 
tranquil period. However, after the collapse of the main CDS market dealers, the market starts 
pricing counterparty risk and CDS contracts written on the same reference entity are sold at 
different prices depending on the creditworthiness of the seller. Contrary to non-financial 
contracts, we cannot find any counterparty risk effect on financial contracts. The higher 
correlation between financial firms and the major counterparties on the CDS market, also 
belonging to the financial sector, is not priced on the CDS spreads of financial firms. This 
finding leads us to think that after the financial crisis investors expect that the implementation of 
regulatory measures and government intervention with the aim of avoiding systemic risk, are 
sufficient to guarantee the fulfillment of the credit derivative contract even under default of the 
counterparty.  
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Appendix 
Figure 2 
Time Series Graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
V
IX
 I
n
d
e
x
VIX Index BMW DEUTSCHE BANK
B) CDS Spread and VIX Index
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
iT
ra
x
x
 In
d
e
x
iTRaxx Index BMW DEUTSCHE BANK
A) CDS Spread and iTRaxx Index
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
S
&
P
 5
0
0
S&P 500 BMW DEUTSCHE BANK
C) CDS Spread and S&P 500
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
R
is
k
 F
re
e
 R
a
te
Risk Free Rate BMW DEUTSCHE BANK
D) CDS Spread and Risk Free Rate
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
Im
p
li
e
d
 V
o
la
ti
li
ty
BMW IMP.VOL. DEUTSCHE BANK IMP.VOL. BMW CDS DEUTSCHE BANK CDS
E) CDS Spread and Implied Volatility
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
C
D
S
 S
p
re
a
d
S
to
c
k
 P
ri
c
e
BMW St. Price DEUTSCHE BANK St. Price BMW CDS DEUTSCHE BANK CDS
F) CDS Spread and Stock Price
32 
 
Table 3 
 Co-integration Analyses Results with Structural Break 
 
Reference Entity
Model Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3
Break Date Mar-09 Feb-07 Mar-09 May-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Jul-08 Dec-09 Oct-08 Mar-08 Mar-08 Dec-08 Dec-08 Sep-08 Sep-08 Nov-07 Jan-09 Dec-07 Nov-08
Intercept -66.6 -68.9 ** 8.70 8.66 67.9* 24.9 -35.7** -35.8** -56.9** -47.8* 31.5** 16.2 7.90 9.47 -12.9 -1.57 -28.7 -34.8** -27.5** -24.6**
(-1.36) (-2.00) (1.62) (1.49) (1.91) (0.42) (-2.11) (-2.27) (-2.41) (-1.90) (2.69) (0.96) (1.37) (1.52) (-0.78) (-0.10) (-1.49) (-2.83) (-3.40) (-2.59)
Dummy 54.2** -38.1 -9.00** 45.9 36.3** 64.8 27.5** 11.9 -54.3** -14.0 -8.87* 34.7 49.4** 63.5* 17.9** -45.0 17.03 257.9** -9.54** 9.69
(4.45) (-0.38) (-3.17) (1.40) (2.71) (0.81) (6.15) (0.28) (-4.20) (-0.13) (-1.86) (1.44) (11.8) (1.94) (4.62) (-0.84) (1.53) (2.40) (-2.14) (0.42)
iTraxx Index 1.41** 1.81** 0.58** 0.54** 0.56** 0.40 0.86** 0.74** 1.52** 1.08** 0.72** 0.57** 0.22** 0.23 0.47** 0.33** 0.71** 1.21** 0.94** 0.98**
(5.93) (10.06) (9.02) (6.76) (2.05) (1.14) (7.37) (4.51) (7.60) (4.25) (7.93) (3.65) (3.94) (0.00) (7.20) (4.42) (3.35) (9.89) (13.9) (12.6)
VIX Index -5.43** -1.13 -0.42 -0.06 2.26* 2.07 -0.24 1.55* 1.57 2.54** -0.51 0.33 0.81** 1.00** -0.69 0.60 -0.74 -0.26 -0.69* -0.5
(-4.72) (-1.10) (-1.20) (-0.12) (1.71) (1.33) (-0.39) (1.64) (1.56) (1.97) (-1.17) (0.41) (3.80) (4.10) (-1.57) (1.25) (-0.80) (-0.36) (-1.65) (-0.93)
Implied Volatility 2.76** 0.07 0.41* 0.21 0.82 0.99 0.32 -0.03 1.86** 1.6 0.07 -0.19 0.90** 0.70** 0.93** 0.07 2.25** 1.43** 1.16** 1.11**
(6.40) (1.35) (1.91) (0.74) (0.98) (1.03) (1.13) (-0.7) (2.14) (1.25) (0.23) (-0.31) (3.62) (2.35) (2.76) (0.17) (4.59) (3.54) (4.40) (3.44)
Stock Price 0.09 -0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -3.15** -1.81 0.32 0.1 0 0 -1.02** -0.39 -0.08** -0.08** -0.06 -0.24 -0.06 0.05 0.08 0.01
(1.18) (-0.01) (-0.72) (-0.47) (-4.35) (-1.35) (1.61) (0.50) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-2.60) (-0.59) (-5.11) (-4.68) (-0.17) (-0.68) (-0.14) (-0.20) (1.34) (-0.24)
Dummy*iTraxx Index -1.08** 0.09 1.27** -0.08 0.08 0.26 0.01 0.45** -0.65** -0.14
(-2.75) (0.53) (-2.05) (-0.36) (0.17) (1.35) (0.12) (3.24) (-2.27) (-0.94)
Dummy*VIX Index -2.32 -1.41* -1.67 -2.48** -5.24** -1.53 -0.81 -3.71** -2.02 -0.28
(-1.24) (-1.68) (-0.62) (-2.13) (-2.18) (-1.60) (-1.43) (-4.50) (-1.43) (-0.31)
Dummy*Implied Volatility 4.32** 0.23 -0.82 0.71 9.3** 0.28 0.54 2.34** -0.99 0.03
(6.64) (0.41) (-0.49) (1.14) (-3.47) (-0.38) (0.74) (3.55) (-0.79) (-0.06)
Dummy*Stock Price 0.14 -0.76 -2.29 1.11* -0.03 -1.75** -0.02 1.32 -3.68 0
(-0.74) (-1.61) (-1.40) (-1.81) (-0.72) (-2.03) (-0.34) (-1.05) (-1.74) (-0.00)
Model 2 Shift in the Intercept of the Cointegrating Relationship
Model 3 Shift in the Intercept and Slope of the Cointegrating Relationship
*,** indicates t statistics that are significant at the 10% and 5 % percent level respectively.
Vodafone Tesco Imperial Tobacco Total VinciAviva Bayer BMW Deutsche Bank Philips Electronics
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Table 5 
Univariate Analyses Results on CDS Spread Change 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference Entity
Break Date
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Counterparty Risk -0.29 -0.08 -0.73** -0.60** -0.73 -2.28** -0.02 0.27 -0.74 -2.00** -0.21 -0.62** 0.06 -0.45** 0.44 -0.71** -0.63 -1.56** -0.43 -0.88**
(-0.71) (-0.16) (-2.20) (-4.82) (-1.48) (-4.06) (-0.06) (0.74) (-1.30) (-2.33) (-0.96) (-3.14) (0.22) (-2.43) (1.14) (-4.80) (-1.64) (-4.40) (-1.31) (-2.96)
R
2 15% 0% 17% 36% 8% 29% 0% 2% 6% 35% 3% 25% 0% 21% 14% 41% 9% 50% 7% 28%
iTraxx Index 1** 1.27** 0.8** 0.42** 0.83** 2.04** 0.69** 0.63** 0.92** 1.64** 0.46** 0.55** 0.45** 0.68** 0.4** 0.45** 0.86** 1.05** 0.76** 1**
(4.30) (3.80) (6.96) (3.41) (9.65) (2.51) (8.92) (2.18) (5.88) (2.04) (5.39) (3.64) (6.67) (4.90) (5.39) (2.16) (10.42) (3.62) (14.66) (5.35)
R
2 74% 22% 80% 28% 82% 22% 70% 17% 66% 24% 55% 28% 77% 56% 57% 17% 66% 36% 88% 56%
S&P 500 Index -2.55** -1.89 -2.13** -0.6 -2.96** -2.73 -1.70** -1.06 -3.91** -3.09 -1.3** -0.41 -1.63** -1.65** -1.58** -0.31 -2.32** -1.66 -1.78** -2.08**
(-2.61) (-1.16) (-5.15) (-1.06) (-4.82) (-1.06) (-3.38) (-1.04) (-4.64) (-1.26) (-3.41) (-0.62) (-5.79) (-4.84) (-4.00) (-0.45) (-4.20) (-1.16) (-3.50) (-2.71)
R
2 47% 5% 56% 6% 47% 7% 42% 5% 54% 14% 42% 2% 56% 55% 47% 1% 47% 10% 48% 27%
The t -statistics (in parantheses) are based on the White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. 
*,** indicates t statistics that are significant at the 10% and 5 % percent level respectively.
Before indicates Before Break Date and After indicates After Break Date.
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Table 6 
Multivariate Analyses Results on CDS Spread Change 
 
Reference Entity
Break Dates
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Intercept 1.99* -2.17 -0.74 -1.86 0.32 -11.72 0.61 2.96 0.67 -16.6** 0.22 -1.82 0.3 -2.07 0.38 -3.59 1.63 -1.47 0.46 -0.73
(1.87) (-0.27) (-1.34) (-0.78) (0.39) (-1.19) (0.65) (0.73) (0.32) (-2.08) (0.38) (-0.78) (0.44) (-1.00) (0.52) (-1.43) (1.35) (-0.37) (1.12) (-0.25)
iTraxx 0.91** 1.5** 0.88** 0.46** 0.87** 2.15* 0.68** 0.57** 0.91** 1.00 0.40** 0.74** 0.38** 0.51** 0.29** 0.50 0.93** 0.96** 0.93** 0.91**
(6.92) (4.59) (7.27) (3.19) (6.92) (1.83) (5.77) (2.31) (4.12) (1.53) (3.35) (3.93) (5.51) (3.58) (4.91) (1.74) (5.71) (2.51) (10.38) (3.70)
VIX Index -0.22 -1.63** 0.05 -0.45 -0.07 -1.43 0.09 0.62 0.49 1.63 0.22 -1.15** 0.39** 0.3 0.74** -0.72 -0.50 0.35 -0.52** 0.49
(-0.61) (-2.17) (0.20) (-1.16) (-0.13) (-0.49) (0.25) (0.65) (0.45) (1.35) (0.89) (-2.16) (3.12) (0.62) (2.00) (-0.80) (-1.03) (0.28) (-3.17) (0.75)
Interest Rate -15.7* -15.4 11.04** -15.5 7.03 -71.2 -1.41 16.05 10.39 -95.01** -1.60 -12.6 -1.72 -20.04** -0.22 -21.90 -6.28 -3.94 4.14 0.87
(-1.74) (-0.67) (2.20) (-1.42) (1.09) (-1.05) (-0.22) (1.17) (0.52) (-2.56) (-0.35) (-1.01) (-0.36) (-2.45) (-0.07) (-1.28) (-0.82) (-0.12) (1.20) (0.05)
∆CDSt-1 0.42** -0.07 -0.16** -0.08 0.1 -0.24 0.15 -0.56** 0.14 -0.33* 0.11 0.07 0 -0.07 0.05 -0.29 0.18 0.01 0.05 -0.07
(2.71) (-0.39) (-2.46) (-0.55) (1.38) (-0.99) (0.50) (-3.87) (0.79) (-1.84) (0.95) (0.38) (-0.02) (-0.59) (0.53) (-0.93) (1.32) (0.07) (0.77) (-0.80)
R2 86% 25% 84% 38% 84% 32% 72% 53% 68% 49% 57% 47% 81% 67% 69% 38% 71% 36% 91% 58%
Reference Entity
Break Dates
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Intercept -5.12* 32.95 -1.7 -4.24 -4.76 -12.14 0.23 -3.36 -4.24 -32.2 -0.42 0.71 -1 -4.57 7.25 -3.01 -7.35** -3.49 -11.21* -1.92
(-1.84) (0.94) (-0.35) (-0.76) (-0.56) (-0.59) (0.10) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.80) (-0.08) (0.07) (-0.40) (-0.87) (1.29) (-0.78) (-3.27) (-0.53) (-1.69) (-0.24)
Implied Volatility 0.86* -1.13 0.28 0.05 0.34 -1.49 * 0.57** 1.06** 0.29 5.37** 0.44 0.48 0.86** 0.91 -0.03 -0.27 0.81** -0.06 0.3 0.82
(1.85) (-1.18) (1.37) (0.24) (0.93) (-1.93) (3.36) (2.24) (0.39) (3.49) (1.50) (1.43) (2.37) (1.48) (-0.11) (-0.48) (2.41) (-0.15) (1.22) (1.28)
Stock Return -0.51* -2.64* -0.35** -0.3 -0.61** -2.36** -0.36** 0.31 -1.38 2.41* -0.18 0.00 -0.26 -0.51 -0.54** -0.74 -0.11 -0.74 -0.27 -0.47
(-1.80) (-1.77) (-2.03) (-0.79) (-3.02) (-2.50) (-2.21) (0.78) (-1.55) (1.89) (-1.20) (0.02) (-1.14) (-0.77) (-2.09) (-0.77) (-0.47) (-1.27) (-1.41) (-0.49)
Liquidity 2.55* -4.39 1.12 1.17 2.21 6.24 0.29 1.1 2.37 3.19 0.32 -0.33 0.57 0.83 -2.09 0.63 2.31** 0.45 4.11* 0.56
(1.86) (-1.08) (0.68) (0.82) (0.63) (1.04) (0.33) (0.99) (1.00) (0.75) (0.24) (-0.13) (0.63) (0.98) (-1.22) (0.70) (3.65) (0.46) (1.84) (0.29)
Counterparty Risk 0.23 0.06 -0.63** -0.56** -0.46 -1.00* 0.15 -0.12 -0.33 -1.52** -0.12 -0.67** 0.06 -0.25** 0.26 -0.82** -0.75** -1.55** -0.28 -0.59*
(0.69) (0.09) (-2.58) (-3.45) (-1.05) (-1.93) (0.41) (-0.31) (-0.61) (-3.16) (-0.44) (-2.34) (0.19) (-2.74) (0.88) (-3.58) (-2.64) (-3.53) (-0.96) (-1.60)
∆CDSt-1 0.22 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.18 0.05 -0.66** 0.18 -0.03 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.21 -0.03 -0.24* -0.05 -0.05 -0.3 -0.24*
(0.99) (-0.31) (-0.56) (-0.40) (-0.09) (-1.66) (0.29) (-5.03) (0.59) (-0.19) (0.57) (0.97) (0.32) (1.51) (-0.13) (-1.81) (-0.38) (-0.52) (-1.29) (-1.86)
Imp. Volatility(-1) 0.41 4.53** 0.24 0.88*
(1.27) (5.53) (0.59) (1.71)
Stock Return(-1) -0.61*
(-1.75)
R2 55% 22% 44% 47% 34% 77% 56% 49% 28% 58% 25% 31% 45% 59% 34% 53% 49% 55% 42% 48%
The t -statistics (in parantheses) are based on the White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. 
*,** indicates t statistics that are significant at the 10% and 5 % percent level respectively.
Before indicates Before Break Date and After indicates After Break Date.
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